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The Issue of Personal Choice:
The Competent Incurable Patient and
the Right to Commit Suicide?
Rebecca C. Morgan*
Thomas C. Marks, Jr."
Barbara Harty-Golder *"
I. INTRODUCTION
Medicine has made many advances in prolonging life artificially. As a
result, people who in the past would have been sent home to die, can have life
prolonged for months and years by artificial medical technology.1 These
people are in limbo, alive, but not having life. American society has great
reverence for life including, apparently, the kind of life that may be given
through artificial life-prolonging procedures. Consequently, the quality of a
patient's life, many times is eclipsed by the medical profession's ability to
sustain that patient's physical existence through artificial medical procedures.2
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1. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2883 (1990).
2. Id. at 2859, 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia in his concurring
opinion noted "the constantly increasing power of science to keep the human body
1
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Indeed, in many cases, it seems that the length of time a person is alive
has become more important than the satisfaction of that person with the
quality of life.3 Government regulation over the medical profession and other
health care providers, including hospitals and nursing homes, has grown over
the past decade. That, coupled with the proliferation of lawsuits against health
care providers, results in more frequent utilization of life-support measures.
Additionally, this regulation and fear of liability, both from the providers and
family, has resulted in courts being asked to decide when it is appropriate for
a life-prolonging procedure to be halted and an individual to be allowed to
die.4
There is no question that an individual who is competent generally has
the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment.5 In fact, a health care
professional who treats a person in a non-emergency situation without that
person's consent is liable to that individual.6 Further, in the recent past,
courts have made it quite clear that a once-competent individual also has the
right to refuse medical treatment.
7
Whether an incurably-ill' competent individual who refuses medical
treatment has a concomitant right to commit suicide9 is a question that the
alive for longer than any reasonable person would want to inhabit it." Id. at 2859.
3. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1990).
4. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (N.J. 1987).
5. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-47.
6. Id. at 2846; see generally Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906); Mohr v.
Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Genzel
v. Halverson, 80 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957); Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
7. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990) (citing John F.
Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984)); see also Cruzan,
110 S. Ct. at 2852.
8. Many states have right-to-die or living will statutes. A common condition
triggering these statutes is a terminal illness and imminent death. However, a terminal
condition or imminence of death cannot be defined legally, but is simply i question
to be determined as best as possible by the medical profession. See, e.g., McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 630 (Nev. 1990) (a patient is terminally ill if the non-
attending physicians certify that life expectancy with or without life support is less
than six months). In this Article, the individual does not have to be "terminal" but
must have a condition that is incurable and will be the ultimate cause of the person's
death.
9. This does not encompass an individual who is depressed or suffering from a
mental condition that results in the person's desire to commit suicide, or the case of
mental illness per se. Neither does this Article encompass or address the question of
whether a surrogate has the ability to implement a once-competent, now currently
[Vol. 57
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judicial system and society must now face ° This Article hypothesizes that
an incurably-ill competent individual has the right to affirmatively act to end
his life when, after appropriate medical treatment, his life no longer has
quality to him. Additionally, this Article takes the position that the right of
an incurably-il competent individual to commit suicide is a reflection of the
law of individual choice. Prior judicial opinions have laid substantial
groundwork for the resolution of this issue.11 This Article simply takes the
incompetent, individual's wish to commit suicide. Nor does this Article address
physician participation.
Suicide is a word that is extremely inflammatory and perhaps is ill-suited to
describe the hypothetical posed in this Article. It is important to remember that this
Article addresses the right of an individual with an incurable condition to take
affirmative steps to end his life when his life no longer has quality to him. By virtue
of this hypothetical, it is presupposed that the individual is not in the initial stage of
the condition. It is also presupposed that the individual has had what medical
treatment is available, which is to no avail (i.e. the condition is now incurable).
10. It is important to note that courts routinely consider the issue of suicide in
reviewing a right to terminate treatment cases. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belcher-
town State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (one of the four state
interests is prevention of suicide). Generally, courts determine that the individual does
not want to commit suicide, but wants to live without the medical device, or wants to
allow the natural progression of the disease to occur unimpeded by medical procedures.
See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
McKay, 801 P.2d at 619-20; In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 407-08 (N.J. 1987). For a
partial listing of other cases, see McKay, 801 P.2d at 626.
Note that although prevention of suicide is one of the four state interests
considered by the courts in deciding termination of treatment cases, the courts
generally do not discuss the rationale for that interest. See infra note 166 and
accompanying text. The courts do not define the state's interest in preventing suicide
but usually find the interest not applicable in the facts of the case before the bench by
finding that the patient does not have a wish to die, did not cause the underlying
disease or condition and wishes to live, without the life-supporting procedure. See,
e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 627 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985) where the court states:
[D]eclining life-sustaining medical treatment may not properly be viewed
as an attempt to commit suicide. Refusing medical intervention merely
allows the disease to take its natural course; if death were eventually to
occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and not
the result of a self-inflicted injury.
See also In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) ("Nor was
prevention of suicide a pertinent consideration here. A death which occurs after the
removal of life sustaining systems is from natural causes, neither set in motion nor
intended by the patient.").
11. See, e.g., Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05; McKay, 801 P.2d at 625-26; see
infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text. Note that the McKay court states there
1992]
3
Morgan et al.: Morgan: Issue of Personal Choice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
position that the courts may be on the threshold of recognizing that an
incurably-ill person has a right to commit suicide,12 based on either the
common law or constitutional law. Further, it is time to recognize that the
appropriate forum for decision making in these cases is generally not the
courts, but is instead the religious and ethical community.' 3 The law does
have a role in this issue, but it should be limited to enacting statutes to serve
both as a guide and as a safety net to ensure that the appropriate decision is
made.
This Article starts with a review of the history of an individual's right to
make choices dealing with his body, including a history of suicide. It
analyzes the impact that the Cruzan decision has on the decision-making
process of the state courts, lays the foundation for the constitutional right to
commit suicide, examines its impact on society, and concludes that the right
to commit suicide is a question of personal choice best decided outside of the
courts.
is no right to commit suicide. McKay, 801 P.2d at 626.
12. Recognition of this right is not done to encourage individuals to commit
suicide nor to encourage physicians' participation. The right should be recognized
only with appropriate guidelines to protect against abuses.
13. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. The court in Bouvia stated that her
decision to forego medical treatment or life-support... belongs to her. It
is not a medical decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal
question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or judges. It is not
a conditional right subject to approval by ethics committees or courts of
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II. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO
MAKE CHOICES DEALING WITH HIS BODY
A. Historical Overview of the Issue of Suicide
Suicide has long been viewed by English and American societies as
inappropriate for a variety of reasons.'4 Some societies, however, have both
accepted and practiced suicide.s Generally, Western arguments against
suicide are based either upon religion16 or morals.'7 Historically, the
arguments used in England against suicide can be stated as: suicide is a crime
against God; suicide is a crime against society; suicide is a crime against the
King. In other words, it is either a religious wrong, a moral wrong, or a
social wrong.18
Suicide was a social wrong-a bad example that was punished for
deterrence.' 9 Various theologians set out arguments as to why suicide was
a crime against God. One argument reasoned that life and the soul are
received from God and to reject them is a crime against God.2° Augustine
has been attributed with saying that suicide is a sin based upon the sixth
14. The exact date when legal action began to be taken against a suicide is not
known. NORMAN ST. JoHN-STEVAs, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW: LAW AND
CHRISTIAN MORALS IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 234 (1961). As early as
967 A.D., unless the suicide was due to a mental or physical illness, the suicide's
property was forfeited to the lord. Id. Suicide was first viewed as wrong by
Christianity. Suicide as a crime appears to be a Christian creation. ALFRED ALVAREZ,
THE SAVAGE GOD 52 (1970). Early societies were afraid that a suicide's spirit was
evil. GLANVILLE WILLAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 249
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1st ed. 1957).
15. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 249; see also McKay, 801 P.2d at 636 (Springer,
J., dissenting); Louis I. DUBLIN & BESSIE BUNZEL, To BE OR NOT TO BE 139-46,
149-96 (1933); JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 245-52.
16. Certain religions have no stated prohibitions against suicide while others do
have a stated prohibition against suicide. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 249. Hinduism
and Buddhism do not have a stated prohibition. Contrast this with the Jewish,
Christian and Islamic faiths, which do. Id.
17. Some commentators take the position that law and morals exist hand in hand
while others take an opposing view. For a discussion of law and morals, see JOHN-
STEVAS, supra note 14, at 13-49.
18. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 264 (citing SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, 2 SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, Q. 59, 64 art. 3, 5 (Joseph Rickaby trans., London, Bums & Oates
1896)).
19. By punishing suicide, others so inclined would be dissuaded from the "evil
example" set by the suicide. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 235.
20. WILLIAMs, supra note 14, at 250.
1992]
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commandment. 2' It could be argued that, under the Christian view, life on
earth is simply an interlude for the moment when a person dies and achieves
divine glory in heaven. If there were no prohibition through the Church
against suicide, an individual would be tempted to commit suicide, and go to
greater glory earlier.' Blackstone wrote that suicide was an act of cowardice
and a crime against God, as well as a crime against the King.?3 Because
God gave life, life could end only when God chose. The individual who
committed suicide committed a spiritual crime because the individual was, in
effect, playing God.' Blackstone argued that it was a crime against the
King because the King had a desire and a stake in the lives of all of his
subjects.' Suicide deprived the King of this control.
The English arguments for why suicide was inappropriate were primarily
views of Christian society. Historically, other cultures tolerated or even
condoned suicide in certain circumstances.? Additionally there were
commentators who wrote in favor of suicide.27 Suicide has always been a
21. Id. at 255-56. The analysis goes that, under the sixth commandment, to kill
oneself is to kill a man and therefore suicide is homicide and thus inexcusable. Id. at
256.
22. Id.
23. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMFNTARES 189-90 (1771).
24. Id.
25. Id. Judge Brown took the position that suicide was a crime against the King
because the King suffered the loss of one of his subjects. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note
14, at 235.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 251-52. Sir Thomas More in Utopia advocated suicide for people
suffering from incurable conditions after. consent from priests and magistrates. Id. at
251. More wrote
As I said before, the sick are carefully tended, and nothing is
neglected in the way of medicine or diet which might cure them.
Everything possible is done to mitigate the pain of those suffering from
incurable diseases; and visitors do their best to console them by sitting and
talking with them. But if the disease is not only incurable, but excruciat-
ingly and unremittingly painful, then the priests and public officials come
and urge the invalid not to endure further agony. They remind him that he
is now unequal to any of life's duties, a burden to himself and others; he
has really outlived his own death. They tell him he should not let the
disease prey on him any longer, but now that life is simply torture and the
world a mere prison cell, he should not hesitate to free himself, or let others
free him, from the rack of living. This would be a wise act, they say, since
for him death puts an end, not to pleasure, but to agony. In addition, he
would be obeying the advice of priests, who are interpreters of God's will;
thus it will be a pious and holy act.
[Vol. 57
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problematic question for humankind and has throughout history experienced
periodic support.2
Once religion and King determined that suicide was wrong, deterrents
had to be enacted to discourage people from committing suicide.29 The
deterrents were primarily religiously-based, ranging from a denial of funeral
rites,3° cutting off the hand that actually took the person's life and burying
it separately from the rest of the body,3' hanging the body, to burying the
body in such a manner as to discourage suicide." In England, it was
common for a suicide's body to be buried in the road, generally at the
crossroads, with either a stake through the body or a stone placed over the
face.33
Eventually, there developed legally-based deterrents as well.' In
Those who have been persuaded by these arguments either starve
themselves to death or take a drug which frees them from life without any
sensation of dying. But they never force this step on a man against his
will; nor, if he decides against it, do they lessen their care of him. The
man who yields to their arguments, they think, dies an honorable death; but
the suicide, who takes his own life without approval of priests and senate,
him they consider unworthy of either earth or fire, and they throw his body,
unburied and disgraced, into the nearest bog.
SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 80-81 (Ralph Robinson, trans., Birmingham, Eng. 2d ed.
1869). Utopia has also been interpreted as a satirical work. See GEORGE M. LOGAN
& ROBERT M. ADAMS, INTRODUCTION TO THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA XI-Xiii (Logan &
R. Adams eds., 1989).
28. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 246-47, 251. The issue of suicide is currently
experiencing revival, placed on the ballot in Washington State and possibly in New
Hampshire. See infra note 250. Currently, there is a movement toward support of
suicide in certain cases. See, e.g., DERECK HUMPHRY, FINAL Exrr (1991).
29. By punishing a suicide, suicide began to be viewed as a crime. In fact in
early England, it was treated as a felony. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 234-35.
30. In the Talmud, Mishnah, a suicide gets no funeral rites. Id. at 251 (citing
DUBLIN & BUNZEL, supra note 15, at 186).
31. Id. at 246. In Athens, this was practiced and, in addition, the body would be
denied the usual funeral rites. Id.
32. Id. at 233. In England, the body might be hanged and also denied funeral
rites. Id.
33. Id. at 233 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at 190). The stone over the
face or the stake through the body were generally thought to prevent the ghost or
vampire from rising. Additionally, the crossroads contained a religious implication,
in that the crossroads were laid out the same way as a cross. Id. Also, the crossroads
had other significance. The frequent traffic was thought to keep the evil spirit trapped.
If the spirit did escape, the spirit would be confused by the number of roads and be
unable to find its way home. ALVAREZ, supra note 14, at 49.
34. ALVAREZ, supra note 14, at 51-53, 71. Suicide as a criminal act appears to
1992]
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addition to punishment through burial rites, England also required that the
suicide's property be forfeited to the King.35 Judge Bracton wrote that an
individual who committed suicide would have his goods confiscated. Bracton
distinguished two types of individuals committing suicide: first, an incarcerat-
ed individual who killed himself because of fear of prosecution and punish-
ment for a crime he was alleged to have committed; and second, from an
individual who killed himself because he was either tired of living or could
no longer endure physical pain. In the former case, all the goods would be
forfeited, but in the latter case, only the movable goods would be forfeited.36
As observed by Blackstone in his Commentaries, the forfeiture of the goods
or the disreputable burial was intended to act as a deterrent. Theoretically, an
individual would not commit suicide for fear of besmirching the family name
or impoverishing the family. 37
Suicide was subsequently recognized as a criminal act,38 and was
generally viewed as a felony.39 Yet, making suicide a crime was found not
to be a deterrent.40 In England a successful suicide was viewed as crazy and
an unsuccessful suicide a felon.4 '
In America as the common law was adopted by the individual states, 4
suicide was generally not recognized as a crime.43 Denying a body burial
rights or giving a body ignominious burial or seizing the suicide's property
did not really deter the act. As a result, in many states a successful suicide
is not a crime.44 The states have generally recognized that suicide really
be a Christian creation. Id. at 52. Suicide originally was within the Ecclesiastical
Court's jurisdiction. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 233.
35. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 233-34. This practice was abolished by the
Forfeiture Act in 1870. Id. See also Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B. 1563).
36. 2 SAMUEL THORNE, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND
423-24 (1968).
37. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at 190.
38. Suicide was recognized as a sin and a crime by the time of Thomas Aquinas.
DUBUN & BUNZEL, supra note 15, at 202. Attempted suicide was recognized in
England as a criminal act in 1854. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 236.
39. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 234-35.
40. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 276 (citing HARRY ROBERTS, EUTHANASIA, THE
ASPECTS OF LIFE AND DEATH (1936)). How can a successful suicide really be
punished?
41. ALVAREZ, supra note 14, at 48.
42. See, e.g., People v. Callopy, 192 N.E. 634, 638 (Ill..1934); United States
Fidelity v. Carter, 170 S.E. 764, 769-70 (Va. Ct. App. 1933).
43. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 241. The states generally eliminated penalties
for suicide. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2860 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
44. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17.1 (1973) (suicide abolished as an offense);
[Vol. 57
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cannot be effectively punished.4 s In many instances punishment may even
be legally prohibited.46
Currently, even though many states do not view suicide as a crime, it is
still considered inappropriate, and there are actions taken to dissuade an
individual from committing suicide.47 Some states continue to recognize
attempted suicide as a crime.4 It is standard in life insurance policies to
have a suicide clause that limits or nullifies coverage if the policy holder
commits suicide.49 Additionally, if an individual is considered to be a
suicide risk, a danger to himself, many states have a statute that allows the
individual to be taken into custody and either confined to a mental health
facility or receive mental health treatment until the risk of suicide abates.5 °
Burnett v. People, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (Ill. 1903); Hundert v. Commercial Travelers'
Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 279 N.Y.S. 555, 556 (1935) (suicide not a crime but
morally wrong); Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 147 P.2d 227 (Or. 1944)
(suicide not a statutory crime but is morally wrong); Grace v. State, 69 S.W. 529, 530
(Tex. Crim. App. 1902) (suicide not a violation of any law in Texas); see also KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 cmrts. (1988) (suicide not now a crime in Kansas); MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.215 (West 1986) (suicide not a crime). But see Hill v. Nicodemus, 755
F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D. Va. 1991) (suicide is a crime in Virginia); McMahan v. State,
53 So. 89, 91 (Ala. 1910); State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 856 (N.C. 1961) (suicide
is a crime).
45. Hill, 755 F. Supp. at 693; See Willis, 121 S.E.2d at 856; see also supra note
43 and accompanying text.
46. Even though North Carolina found suicide to be a crime in State v. Willis, the
court noted that suicide can not be punished in North Carolina. Willis, 121 S.E.2d at
856; see, e.g., Hill, 755 F. Supp. at 693 (legislature repealed punishment for successful
suicide); McMahan, 53 So. at 90-91 (a successful suicide cannot be punished); see also
VT. CONST. ch II, § 65 (suicide doesn't cause forfeiture of property); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-4 (Michie 1950); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-4 (1966). North Carolina abolished
suicide as a crime in 1973. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17.1 (1973).
47. For example, suicide hotlines or counseling programs, such as crisis
intervention exist in many cities.
48. For a discussion of attempted suicide as a crime, see Royal Circle v.
Achterrath, 68 N.E. 492, 498 (Ill. 1903); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Rice, 52 N.E.2d 624,
626 (Ind. 1944); State v. Campbell, 251 N.W. 717, 718 (Iowa 1933); Darrow v.
Family Fund Soc., 22 N.E. 1093, 1094 (N.Y 1889). See also JOHN-STEVAS, supra
note 14, at 242-43.
49. See, e.g., Estate of Galloway v. Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., 725 P.2d 827
(N.M. 1986); Turkett v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 602 (S.C. 1983).
50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.463, .467 (West 1986); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 632.300 (Supp. 1991); see also People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151, (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (quoting In re Joseph G., 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983) (under modem law,
rather than a crime, committing or attempting suicide is a sign of mental illness)).
1992]
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Perhaps a more effective prohibition against suicide is the one currently used
in many states. Aiding and abetting a suicide is considered a crime. 51
Other countries have a varied view of the appropriateness of suicide. In
both Germany and France, suicide and assisting suicide are not criminal.52
Switzerland, however, punishes assisting suicide unless done for altruistic
motives.53 Italy as well holds that assisting suicide is a crime.m Suicide
51. See State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 856-57 (N.C. 1961). Without a statute
making aiding and abetting a crime, an argument can be made that aiding a suicide is
not a crime if the suicide itself is not a crime. See, e.g., Grace v. State, 69 S.W. 529,
530 (rex. 1902) (the suicide is not guilty and the person furnishing the means/method
is also not guilty). Michigan has no law against assisted suicide. Nancy Gibbs, Dr.
Death Strikes Again, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 78. But see McMahon v. State, 53 So.
89, 91 (Ala. 1910) (guilty of a crime unless the suicide was incompetent); Burnett v.
People, 68 N.E. 505, 510-11 (Ill. 1903); People v. Duffy, 566 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (intentionally causing or aiding another person to commit suicide
violates N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(3)); JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 14, at 244.
States that do have statutes making aiding/abetting suicide a crime include:
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.120(a)(d) (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (1988);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56
(West 1985); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West
1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-31 (Smith-Hurd 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-1-2 (Bums 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit.
17-A, § 204 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-49 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 630:4
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie
1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 120.35, 125.15 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, §§ 813-15 (West 1983); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.125 (1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1976); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West
1989) (repealed effective 9/1/94); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
Although not explicitly providing suicide, ALA. CODE § 13A-25 (1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1990); and WYO. STAT. § 6-1-201 (1977) can be
construed to apply. In Connecticut, if the accused forced one to commit suicide by
force, duress or deception it is considered murder. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a.
(West 1985).
52. Alister Browne, Assisted Suicide and Active Voluntary Euthanasia, 2
CANADIAN J. OF L. & JURISPRUDENCE 35, 36 (1989).
53. Id. at n.7. The Swiss Penal Code provides that "Whoever, from selfish
motives, induces another to commit suicide or assists him therein shall be punished,
if the suicide was successful or attempted, by confinement in a penitentiary for hot
more than five years or by imprisonment." Swiss PENAL CODE, C.P. art. 115.
54. Browne, supra note 52, at n.8. Italy distinguishes the punishment by whether
the suicide was successful:
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is not a crime in Canada, but assisting a suicide is.55 In Great Britain,
suicide itself and attempted suicide are no longer criminal acts,56 as a result
of the Suicide Act of 1961.5  In Japan, the judiciary has separated the
offense of euthanasia from murder.58 Like Great Britain and Canada, Japan
does not criminalize suicide or attempting suicide; assisting suicide, however,
is punishable.59  In Korea, inciting or assisting a suicide is a crime;60 in
New Zealand, aiding or abetting a suicide is a crime.61 Sweden decriminal-
ized attempted suicide.62 The issue of suicide and the right to commit
suicide is extremely controversial and has been one of debate for the human
race for hundreds of years.6 The current debate on suicide becomes more
difficult because of the interchange of the terms assisted suicide and
euthanasia. 64
Whoever instigates another to commit suicide or reinforces his intention to
do so or in any manner promotes the execution of suicide shall be punished,
where the suicide is successful, by confinement from five to twelve years.
Where the suicide is not successful, such person shall be punished by.
confinement from one year to five years, provided that the attempt at
suicide results in a serious or very grave personal injury.
ITALIAN PENAL CODE, C.P. art. 580.
55. Browne, supra note 52, at 35-36. Canada legalized suicide in 1972. Id. at
35.
56. Id. at 35.
57. Allen C. Schlinsog, Jr., The Suicidal Decedent and Tortfeasor Liability, 24
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 463, 469 n.20 (1991).
58. Lynn Trcy Nerland, A Cry For Help: A Comparison of Euthanasia Law, 13
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 115, 131-32 (1989). The guidelines include the
victim has an incurable illness, is suffering unspeakable pain, the doctor's purpose is
to relieve the pain, the patient is competent and has made an informed choice, the
means of causing death are administered by the doctor when possible and are morally
acceptable. Id.
59. Id. at 126 n.79.
60. KOREAN CIuM. CODE c. 24, arts. 252, 253 (1960).
61. Paul Key, Euthanasia: Law & Morality, 6 AUCKLAND U. L. REv. 224, 229
(1989).
62. Nerland, supra note 58, at 123 (citing Hadding, Prevent or Aid Suicide?,
EUTHANASIA 151 (A. Carmi ed. 1984)).
63. See supra notes 14-46 and accompanying text.
64. As stated previously, a discussion of the issue of assisted suicide is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, it is necessary to define euthanasia as it pertains
to suicide. Euthanasia has been divided in the past by commentators into active or
passive euthanasia. Passive euthanasia consists of acts of omission, such as the
withholding or withdrawal of life support. Active euthanasia consists of acts of
commission, such as injecting the patient with a drug for the sole purpose of causing
the patient's death. Barry A. Bostrom, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for
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The Netherlands is generally viewed as having the most progressive
stance on the issue of suicide. The Netherlands' Penal Code contains no
punishment for suicide or attempted suicide.6s Despite perception to the
contrary, assisting suicide is a crime in the Netherlands.' A state commis-
sion, however, wrote recommendations 7 for non-prosecution of a physician
who assisted a patient in committing suicide.'
The Royal Netherlands Society for the Promotion of Medicine issued
Guidelines for Euthanasia69 in 1984. For a request for euthanasia to be
granted, these guidelines must be observed. 70  The guidelines require
voluntariness, an informed request, a repeated request for death, severe pain
and suffering, and a consultation by the attending physician with at least one
other doctor.'
To meet the guidelines of voluntariness, the doctor needs to speak to the
patient alone and, if possible, get the request in writing. The doctor needs to
ascertain if the reason the patient wants to end his life is an appropriate one.
A patient's feeling that he is a burden does not constitute an appropriate
reason.72 If the reason is inappropriate, the request should be denied and
the United States, 4 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 467 (1989).
65. Marian H.N. Driesse et al., Euthanasia and the Law in the Netherlands, 3
IssuES IN L. & MED. 385, 386 (1988).
66. The State Commission on Euthanasia in 1985 defined euthanasia as "the
deliberate action to terminate life, by someone other than, and on request of, the
patient concerned." Henk Rigter, Euthanasia in theNetherlands: DistinguishingFacts
From Fiction, HAsTINGs CrR. RPT. SPEC. SuPp. 31 (Jan./Feb. 1989). Assisted suicide
is a criminal act only if the suicide was successful. B. Sluyters, Euthanasia In The
Netherlands, 57 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 34, 35 (1989).
Article 294 provides that "He who deliberately incites another to suicide, assists
him therein or provides him with the means, is punished, if the suicide follows, with
a prison sentence of at most three years or a fine of the fourth category." (A fourth
category maximum fine equals twenty-five thousand guilders.) Driesse et al., supra
note 65, at 386.
67. The guidelines include the requirements of: the patient's condition is severe
with no chance of improvement, the patient has voluntarily requested clearly and
repeatedly that his life end, all other care options have been refused or used, and the
doctor has consulted with another physician. Robert K. Landers, Right to Die:
Medical, Legal & Moral Issues, EDITORIAL REs. REP., Sept. 28, 1990, at 554, 563
(citing Rigter, supra note 66, at 31).
68. Sluyters, supra note 66, at 38.
69. Driesse, supra note 65, at 429-42.
70. Id. at 431.
71. Id. at 431-33.
72. Id. at 431-32.
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instead, the patient should be informed of alternatives. 73 If there is any other
solution to the problem, the request for euthanasia should be denied.74
To make sure the request is an informed one, the patient must be given
sufficient information about his condition and the alternatives available to him.
If there are other avenues to lessen his suffering, the request should be denied.
The doctor should keep a record of the events and conversations.75
The patient must make repeated requests for death. The guidelines do
not set a minimum number required to be sufficient but do find that only one
request is insufficient.7 6
The patient must experience constant, unbearable, severe pain and
suffering. The doctor can consider the patient's life-style, hobbies, activities,
and the patient's view of his quality of life. This information would come
from repeated, serious conversations with the patient. If there are possibilities
of lessening the pain and suffering, this guideline would not be met.7
The attending physician should consult with at least one other doctor. If
the patient has several treating physicians, the consultation could be between
the treating physicians or with a doctor who has no personal knowledge of the
patient. Additionally, the doctor is encouraged to talk to the nursing staff, a
minister, or counselor. In keeping with patient privacy, the guidelines stress
limiting the consultation to only those absolutely necessary. 78
The Netherlands also allows doctors to give pain medication, even though
the patient's life would, as a result, be shorter.79 There is no exact data on
the number of cases of euthanasia that occur each year in the Netherlands; a
range of numbers has been used.80 In addition to the guidelines, cases are
generally not prosecuted until review by and approval for prosecution has
been done by a committee of five senior prosecutors."




77. Id. at 432-33.
78. Id. at 433.
79. Sluyters, supra note 66, at 38.
80. Although the range of 5000-8000 is most commonly used, this figure is too
high. Rigter, supra note 66, at 32.
81. Sluyters, supra note 66, at 41. The committee considers a number of factors,
including the patient's condition, the patient's desire, the patient's level of competency
to decide, the hopelessness of the condition, others affected, and whether the doctor
consulted with another doctor. Id.
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B. The Individual In a Society
A predictable tension exists between society's perception that suicide is
inappropriate and an individual's right to make choices dealing with his own
body. John Stuart Mill in his essay, On Liberty," recognized that there is
a potential for conflict between one's liberty and the authority that the
government has over him to regulate the exercise of his liberty.' There is
a zone of liberty possessed by each individual on which government cannot
impinge.84 Society has a tendency to try to impose on its members certain
rules of conduct which may diminish or extinguish individuality. Society
wants like-minded people in it.85 There has to be a protection against and
limits on society's imposition of its own will and ideas on an individual.8
Certain individual decisions affect only the individual, and should not be
regulated by government.87 These include control over one's own body and
mind.8s
82. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) (Alburey Castell ed., 1947).
83. Id. at 1.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 4-5. Since suicide is wrong under current societal views, society exerts
its influence to prohibit suicide.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 9-10.
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in
the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used by physical
force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him or
reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be
calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct
of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
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Nonetheless, there is a limitation on an individual's ability to act.89 Yet,
in situations where the issue does not really concern anyone other than the
individual, he should be free to act. 90 If he is not free to make his own
decisions, then his value or worth as a person is diminished. 9' Society is
made up of individuals. What one individual believes is not necessarily the
same as another. What one individual would choose to do is not necessarily
the same as others. Each individual has his own level of tolerable pain,92
and a unique view of a happy life.' Society must allow a person his
individuality if he is to be happy.94 When his action affects only himself,
then he should be absolutely allowed to act in that manner.95
Still, by living in a society, one's existence can affect others' lives.9
The fact that an individual's actions may affect another should be considered
by him before acting.Y It is unusual for a person to live an isolated life,98
and if his actions injure others, then there must be limits on his ability to
act.9 If, however, there is really no impact on others, he should be allowed
to act for "the greater good of human freedom."' °
Id.
89. Id. at 55. Mill recognized that one would have an absolute right to believe
but not an absolute right to act. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
90. MILL, supra note 82, at 56.
91. Id. at 58-59.
92. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2878 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding To Forego
Life Sustaining Treatment at 276 (1983)).
93. MILL, supra note 82, at 68; see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 624 (Nev. 1990).
94. MILL, supra note 82, at 68.
95. Id. at 75-76.
96. Id. at 76.
97. Id. at 76-77.
98. Id. at 80.
99. Id. at 80-82.
100. Id. at 82; see also In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950 (Me. 1987) (quoting
Majorie Maguire Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1985)) (the court recognized the great
importance of personal autonomy and in this regard states: "In general, the more
intense and personal the consequences of a choice and the less direct or significant the
impact of that choice upon others, the more compelling the claim to autonomy in the
making of a given decision." Id.).
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C. Medical Treatment Cases
The idea of bodily integrity and the liberty to control one's body has long
been recognized by the courts in considering the issue of medical treatment.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law."'0 ' In fact, because an individual has such right of control over his
body, a doctor must have the individual's express or implied consent before
the doctor can treat the patient.102 The benefit to the patient is irrelevant if,
absent an emergency, the doctor gives treatment without the patient's
consent. 3 It has also long been recognized that every competent adult has
the right to determine what will be done with his body; a doctor who treats
such an individual without prior consent has assaulted the patient and is liable
to the patient.' 4
Government can regulate an individual's action or non-action where it is
necessary for the health and welfare of society. This justification has been
used, among other things, to require individuals to be compulsorily vaccinated
against diseases that have epidemic proportions and that have, in the past,
killed a great number of people. 5 The Supreme Court has recognized in
such cases that a person, by living in a society, will be subjected to restraints
on his liberty to the furtherance of the health, safety and welfare of soci-
ety.'06 Liberty exists, but it is liberty that the law will regulate in appropri-
ate circumstances. °7 Notwithstanding, there is a zone within which the
individual may exercise his liberty free of any governmental restraint."0 8
101. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). The court goes on
to quote Judge Cooley, who states "[t]he right to one's person may be said to be a
right of complete immunity; to be let alone." Id. at 251 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY,
TORTS 29 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1880)).
102. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905); see also Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2866 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the rule
of general law is the patient, not the doctor, decides the treatment).
103. Id.; accord Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906).
104. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
105. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
106. Id. at 26.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 29.
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D. The "Right-To-Die"1° Cases
The issue of the individual's right to consent to or refuse medical
treatment, or to affirmatively act to end his life in certain circumstances,11°
involves the liberty to do so free of governmental regulation. Over the
passage of time, society has forgotten an important distinction in this issue.
An individual's right to end his life or to refuse medical treatment is not a
legal question. It is a moral, ethical, or religious question."' American
society has lost sight of the fact that, for this issue, religion is separate from
the law and that this is an issue for theologians and ethicists, not routinely the
judiciary. Deciding when an individual will be allowed to die through the
court-ordered termination of medical technology that merely prolongs a body's
existence poses great problems for the courts, due in part to the inherent
unsuitability of this forum to consider these issues.'
Modern cases began to deal with this issue of life and death, first with
refusal of treatment cases that were primarily based upon religious grounds.
Cases were brought to the court involving patients who refused blood
transfusions because of their religion. 3 Next, as medicine advanced and
technology allowed health care professionals to prolong life, the courts began
to see cases asking for the right, the court-ordered right, to cease treatment of
the individual.
Previously, it was clear that individuals had the absolute right to control
their bodies, that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
109. Right-to-Die is a term of art used to describe the ability of an individual to
have life-prolonging procedures withdrawn. These cases concern individuals for whom
there is no hope or cure. They are to be distinguished from medical treatment cases
where the individuals can be cured or restored to a normal, functioning life of quality.
110. Opponents of removal of life-prolonging procedures would argue that halting
such procedures constitutes an affirmative act to end one's life. See, e.g., Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2861 (1960) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(distinction is between refusing ordinary treatment and extraordinary treatment).
111. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("It
is not a medical decision for her physicians to male. Neither is it a legal question
whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or judges.... It is a moral and
philosophical decision that, being a competent adult, is hers alone.").
112. It is common in the opinion for the court to observe that the courts are ill-
equipped to handle these cases and call on the legislature to address the problem. See,
e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980), affg, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
113. See, e.g., "Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc." ex rel. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); St.
Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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right to determine what shall be done with his own body ... ,,14 The state
courts, in deciding right to die cases, turned to Supreme Court decisions for
guidance in deciding right to terminate treatment cases. The two cases most
frequently relied on were Roe v. Wade,"5 and Griswold v. Connecticut.11
The Roe Court recognized that a right of privacy existed under the constitu-
tion."7 The Roe decision was significant precedent for right to terminate
treatment cases because the Court recognized this right of privacy existed as
far back as Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford."' The Court asserted
that personal rights such as these are "fundamental" rights or rights that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."" 9 The Roe Court found this
right of privacy included the right of a woman to decide whether to have an
abortion.?0 The Court also recognized that the privacy right is not an
absolute right but is subject to regulation by the state because of the state's
specific interests,' when those state interests are compelling.'
The Griswold case also recognized a zone of privacy that is based on,
and initiated by, the constitutional guarantees that would be considered
fundamental."23 The Griswold opinion, like the Roe opinion, recognized that
the government has the right to limit this fundamental interest, but the state
interests or governmental interests which balance against the right must be
narrowly drawn.U Fundamental rights are not defined in the Constitution
and have to be defined by the court, and the Supreme Court has indicated a
114. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 101 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)); see also
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960), clarified, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan.
1960).
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
116. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
117. The opinion noted that the right of privacy under the United States
Constitution could be located in either the First Amendment, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in
liberty guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
118. Id. (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
119. Id. at 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Palko
was overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
121. Id. at 154.
122. Id. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963)).
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hesitance to redefine both fundamental rights and what rights are considered
to be fundamental. 1
Within this framework of cases dealing with an individual's right to
consent to medical treatment, and the right of privacy in one's own body, state
courts began to decide an individual's right to terminate medical treatment.
E. The "Modern" Cases
The first and landmark case of an individual's right to terminate medical
treatment is the 1976 case of In re Quinlan. Although there have been
numerous cases decided at the state court level since Quinlan, Quinlan was
still considered the basis for state decisions on the right to terminate treatment
up until the United States Supreme Court decision of Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health.2 In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
Karen Ann Quinlan had a righf of privacy to have a respirator that was
maintaining her life"28 removed, terminating that treatment. The New Jersey
Supreme Court considered several different bases for this right and concluded
that it was based upon her Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy.' 9 The
court identified what it considered to be state interests that must be balanced
against Karen Ann Quinlan's right to have the respirator terminated. Those
state interests included the preservation of life and the maintenance of the
integrity of the medical profession. 3 °
Quinlan dealt with a once-competent individual who was currently
incompetent, and who had made prior expressions of her position on the use
of life-prolonging procedures. 3' The next significant case was decided in
125. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). In his dissent in Cruzan,
Justice Brennan found that the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment was
fundamental. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2865 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
127. 110 S. Ct. at 2847-51.
128. Note that after the respirator was removed, Karen Ann Quinlan lived for
almost ten years, breathing on her own and her existence was maintained by a feeding
tube. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
129. Id. at 662-63.
130. Id. at 663.
131. Note that in Quinlan, the court discredited Karen Ann's statements about her
views on the use of life-prolonging procedures as not probative. Id. at 664. However,
in a subsequent New Jersey Supreme Court opinion, the court reversed itself and
indicated that it should have given weight to Karen Ann's statements. See In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985).
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1977 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 2 The Massachusetts
court was not faced with the issue of removing a medical apparatus from an
individual, but with whether an individual who had never been competent had
the right to refuse medical treatment that would prolong life but not cure the
individual. 33 The Saikewicz case is extremely significant in that it laid out
what it considered to be the relevant state interests that would be balanced
against an individual's right of privacy to refuse life-prolonging proce-
dures."34 The court determined that the appropriate state interests to be
balanced against an individual's right of privacy were the preservation of life,
the prevention of suicide, the protection of third parties, and the maintenance
of the integrity of the medical profession3 5 Although these four state
interests are the ones most utilized by courts, subsequent courts have
determined that these are not necessarily the exclusive state interests.3 6
The Saikewicz court, as have many subsequent state courts, recognized
that the most significant of these articulated state interests is the preservation
of life. 3 7 The court also recognized that there is a difference when the
question before the court involves a curable condition as opposed to a
situation where the only question is how long the individual's life would be
maintained.138 In other words, there is a distinction between cases where an
individual is refusing treatment that would cure the individual, from cases
where an individual refuses treatment for a condition from which there is no
recovery.139
The last of the key modern cases for subsequent decisions was the case
of Satz v. Perlmutter."40 This case differed from both Quinlan and
Saikewicz in that the individual in question was competent and able to express
his wish that the respirator be disconnected. The court, utilizing the four state
interests of Saikewicz, found that none of the four state interests outweighed
132. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977).
133. The individual was 67 years old with a mental status of 2 years and 8
months and was suffering from leukemia. The medical procedure was chemotherapy.
Id. at 420.
134. Id. at 424-27.
135. Id. at 425.
136. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 266 n.11 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (other state interests applicable besides the four enumerated); McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev. 1990) (adding a fifth interest and encouraging
charitable contributions for medical treatment of the poor).
137. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425; See also Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
138. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
139. Id.
140. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
[Vol. 57
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/6
INCURABLE PATIENT AND SUICIDE
Mr. Perlmutter's right to terminate his treatment. His right was founded on
his constitutional right of privacy.14' The court recognized if an individual
has the right to consent to treatment, then the individual also has a "concomi-
tant right to discontinue it."'42 If, once a competent adult has expressed that
it is his wish that treatment be terminated, continuing treatment simply inflicts
"never ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially
suspended, moment of death. Such a course of conduct invades the patient's
constitutional right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice and invades his
right to self-determine.' ' 143 In cases like these, the patient needs comfort,
not treatment.'"
II. THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF A
COMPETENT PERSON TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT ON
OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS GROUNDS
A. The United States Supreme Court's Decision in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health45
The United States Supreme Court decision in Cruzan was anxiously
awaited, but as will be seen, really had little impact on the way state courts
decide right to terminate life support cases. The court substituted liberty for
privacy, but essentially left unchanged the analysis to be used by the
courts.' 46 The Court found that the right to refuse treatment is based on a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest rather than a constitutional privacy
right used by numerous state courts before Cruzan.47 The Court recognized
the need to balance this "liberty interest against the relevant state inter-
ests."'" Since Cruzan involved a person who was not then competent, the
141. Satz, 379 So. 2d at 360 (citing and adopting Satz, 362 So. 2d at 162).
142. Satz, 362 So. 2d at 163.
143. Id. at 164.
144. Id. at 163.
145. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). The Supreme Court decided that due process was
not violated when the Supreme Court of Missouri required "clear and convincing"
proof that Nancy Cruzan had, prior to the automobile accident that left her in persistent
vegetative state, expressed her desire not to be kept alive under those circumstances.
Id. at 2852.
146. Id. at 2843.
147. See id. at 2851 n.7.
148. Id. at 2851-52. The Supreme Court here merely recognized that determining
the effect of any non-absolute right required that the interests protected by that non-
absolute right be balanced against the governmental interest that put that right in
jeopardy in the first place. Id.
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Court "assumed" for the "purposes of this case" that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "would grant to a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition., 149 The Court cautioned, however,
that "[a]lthough we think the logic of the cases discussed"5° above would
embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic consequences involved in refusal
of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of
that interest is constitutionally permissible.'
51
Since the remainder of the majority opinion in Cruzan deals with the
rights of a once competent person who was now incompetent,152 what the
Court did say about the competent person's rights must be applied. Before
doing so, the three groundbreaking cases 153 identified by the Supreme Court
in Cruzan should be measured against what the Supreme Court said in
Cruzan.
B. The Effect of Cruzan on the Early
Precedent-Setting Cases-Liberty v. Privacy
As previously indicated, the first court to grapple with the issue of the
right to refuse medical treatment outside of a religious reason appears to be
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the well-known case of Karen Ann
149. Id. at 2852.
150. Id. at 2846-50. These cases apparently include Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal.
1988); McConnell v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989); In re Estate
of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch.
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985);
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re
Westchester County Medical Center, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988); In re Storar, 438
420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y.
1914).
151. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852. Presumably the Court, since it declined to find
that privacy included the right to refuse nutrition and hydration, would treat the liberty
interest in doing so to some test that is less rigorous than the compelling governmental
interest that a deprivation of privacy entails. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Cruzan upheld the Missouri Supreme
Court's use of the "clear and convincing" standard for determining Nancy Cruzan's
wishes as stated by her before she was rendered incompetent. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at
2854.
153. "Many of the later cases build on the principles established in Quinlan,
Saikewicz and StorarEichner." Id. at 2848; see also In re Estate of Longeway, 549
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Quinlan. 54 That court found that she had a privacy right under the United
States Constitution that was "[b]road enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the
same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate
pregnancy under certain conditions." 155 The New Jersey Supreme Court
also relied on the state constitution." 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not suggest that the privacy it was
discussing was necessarily a fundamental right -which would trigger the
compelling governmental interest test, although it did mention Roe v.
Wade. 57  Thus, after Cruzan, the question must be: would the balance
struck by the New Jersey Supreme Court under privacy be any different under
Fourteenth Amendment liberty as espoused by the United States Supreme
Court in Cruzan?
154. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Ms.
Quinlan, for unknown reasons, was in a "chronic persistent vegetative state" being kept
alive by a respirator and a nasal-gastro tube. Id. at 654-55. The question with which
the New Jersey Supreme Court had to deal was whether she had a constitutional right
to refuse (through her father) further use of these extraordinary medical procedures and
thus to let nature and her condition take their course leading to her death. Id. at 652.
It is unclear whether such discontinuance of treatment included the nasal-gastro tube
used for hydration and sustenance or was limited to the respirator. The better view
probably is that the court decision contemplated only the respirator in that several
times the court spoke of a singular life support system. Id. at 671.
155. Id. at 663 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113). It should, however, be noted that the
"penumbra theory" was not unanimously accepted by the Supreme Court. Justice
Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan bolstered that theory
through the use of the Ninth Amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan, using a pure substantive due process argument, found that "[t]he due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own
bottom." Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). The Supreme Court has
apparently adopted the Harlan view. "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is ..... Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
156. "Nor is such a right of privacy forgotten in the New Jersey Constitution."
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing NJ. CONST. art. I, para. 1 (1947)). The text of that
provision reads "[a]ll persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness." Id. (citing NJ. CONsT. art. I, para. 1 (1947)).
157. Id. The New Jersey court did comment that it saw "no external compelling
interest [which] could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few
measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of
cognitive or sapient life." Id.
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The answer to this question would appear to be "no." The New Jersey
Supreme Court identified two state interests, or at least "claimed" state
interests: (1) "essentially the preservation and sanctity of human life"; and (2)
"defense of the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
according to his best judgment."'B
As to the first articulated state interest, rather than erect the compelling
governmental interest test, the court merely found that as the treatment
becomes more invasive while the prognosis for meaningful recovery.
decreases, the state's interest in the preservation of life will at some point give
way to the individual's-whether it is described as "privacy" or "liberty.
'0 59
After lengthy discussion as to the second state interest (the right of the
physician to administer medical treatment according to his best judgment), the
court determined the then prevailing medical guidelines were not binding on
the court in ruling.16°
Apart from the one reference to the word "compelling," if Cruzan's
refusal of a right to refuse medical treatment were categorized as privacy
nothing would have changed in the Quinlan opinion. Using Cruzan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court would merely have substituted the word "liberty" for
the word "privacy." Put differently, there is nothing to suggest that the
government interests in Quinlan were subject to the strict scrutiny of the
compelling government interest test.
The second case referred to by the Supreme Court that also used
constitutional privacy as a source of the right to refuse medical treatment was
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.161 It also stressed
158. Id.
159. Id. at 664.
160.' Id. at 669. The court then went on to conclude that no criminal liability
would be involved in withdrawing Karen's life support system if the conditions it set
out were followed. These conditions were:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the
responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable
possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition
to a cognitive, sapient state and that the life-support apparatus now being
administered to Karen should be discontinued, they shall consult with the
hospital "Ethics Committee" [sic] or like body of the institution in which
Karen is hospitalized.
Id. at 671.
161. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
also found the right to refuse medical treatment in the common law. Id. at 424. The
court, however, recognized the constitutional right as being "[o]f even broader import."
(Vol. 57
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the importance of constitutional privacy as a basis for refusing life-prolonging
procedures. 62
Of major importance is the court's "distilling" of four state concerns
against which the privacy right to refuse treatment is to be measured. These
are "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent
third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical
integrity of the medical profession.'
163
As was the case with Quinlan, it does not appear that the change from
"privacy" to "liberty" would have made any difference in a case like
Saikewicz. Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts anchored
the right to refuse medical treatment in the Federal Constitution, it never
162. IL The court stated:
[A]rising from the same regard [as the common law] for human dignity and
self-determination, is the unwritten constitutional right and privacy found
in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights ... [Tihis
constitutional guaranty . .. encompasses the right of a patient to preserve
his or her right to privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily
integrity in appropriate circumstances.
Id.
163. Id. at 425. Balancing these state concerns against the privacy interests of a
profoundly retarded senior citizen at a state institution, the Massachusetts court
concluded that the privacy interest prevailed and thus Mr. Saikewicz would not receive
chemotherapy treatment which he would not understand and which would be
debilitating with small hope of any significant improvement in his condition. Id. at
435.
Although the case did not involve suicide the opinion does contain language
which could have a bearing on that topic.
The interest of the State in prolonging a life must be reconciled with the
interest of an individual to reject the traumatic cost of that prolongation.
There is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be
saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State interest where,
as here, the issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost
to the individual that life may be briefly extended .... The constitutional
right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the sanctity of
individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of
life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to It
refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the
right of choice.
Id. at 425-26 (footnote omitted).
The above quote could be read to sanction suicide under the conditions proposed.
The court also discussed the question of the quality of life in a way that seems
favorable to our argument. It pointed out that diminished quality of life caused by the
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applied the compelling government interest test that "privacy" should trigger.
In other words, the state's interests were never put to the rigor of that test.
As to the first state purpose or interest found by the court, "the
preservation of life," the Saikewicz opinion on why that interest loses out
under a set of facts like those before the court certainly does not read like an
application of the compelling governmental interest test:
It is clear that the most significant of the asserted State interests is that of
the preservation of human life. Recognition of such an interest, however,
does not necessarily resolve the problem where the affliction or disease
clearly indicates that life will soon, and inevitably, be extinguished. The
interest of the State in prolonging a life must be reconciled with the interest
of an individual to reject the traumatic cost of that prolongation. There is
a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be saved
where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State interest where, as
here, the issue is not whether, but when, for how long, and at what cost the
individual life may be briefly extended. Even if we assume that the State
has an additional interest in seeing to it that individual decisions on the
prolongation of life do not in any way tend to "cheapen" the value which
is placed in the concept of living we believe it is not inconsistent to
recognize a right to decline medical treatment in a situation of incurable
illness. The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an
expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination
as fundamental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is
lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow
a competent human being the right of choice.164
There would not seem to be any reason to believe that the above holding
would be any different under the Supreme Court's "liberty" standard. The
court then considered the other three state interests, the effect of the patient's
death on other people, the prevention of suicide and the integrity of the
medical profession and found that they either did not apply or were satis-
fied.16 Further, as is typical with the courts, passing consideration was
given to the state interest in preventing suicide, without fully explaining the
underlying justification for the interest. 16
164. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
165. Id. at 426-27.
166. The court in Saikewicz gave the following explanation:
The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require little if any
discussion. In the case of the competent adult's refusing medical treatment
such an act does not necessarily constitute suicide since (1) in refusing
treatment the patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even
if he did, to the extent that the cause of death was from natural causes the
patient did not set the death producing agent in motion with the intent of
[Vol. 57
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Looked at this way, it would appear that since those pre-Cruzan cases
that relied on privacy as the source of the right to refuse medical treatment did
not actually put the state to the rigorous compelling governmental interest test,
the change from "privacy" to "liberty" is of no great moment, no matter what
the Supreme Court thought when it made the change.
The third case mentioned by the Supreme Court, Eichner v. Dillon,67
also located the right to refuse medical treatment in both the common law and
the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy."6 The New York Court quoted
Roe v. Wade. 69
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line
of decisions, however, going back to Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford...
the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. 7
The New York court went on to opine that,
this right has been discerned within the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,
and from the language of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution .... However, "only personal rights that
can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy". . . . Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking of the constitutional right of privacy, declared that "the
freedom to care for one's health and person" falls within its purview,
adding that the "right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the
physician-patient relationship". We believe that the essence of this right is
autonomy over matters of personal integrity, including control over one's
body, and that such a right is fundamental within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment .... " By parity of reasoning, [with Roe v. Wade]
the constitutional right to privacy, we believe, encompasses the freedom of
causing his own death. Furthermore, the underlying State interest in this
area lies in the prevention of irrational self-destruction. What we consider
here is a competent, rational decision to refuse treatment when death is
inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of cure or preservation of life.
There is no connection between the conduct here in issue and any State
concern to prevent suicide.
Id. at 426 n.11 (citations omitted).
167. 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
168. "We believe, however, that [the patient's] right to refuse treatment when
competent rests on a far more fundamental principle of law: the constitutional right
to privacy." Id. at 537.
169. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the terminally ill but competent individual to choose for himself whether or
not to decline medical treatment where he reasonably believes that such
treatment will only prolong his sufferings needlessly, and serve merely to
denigrate his conception of the quality of life. The decision by the
incurably-ill to forego medical treatment and allow the natural processes of
death to follow their inevitable course is so manifestly a "fundamental"
decision in their lives, that it is virtually inconceivable that the right of
privacy would not apply to it. Individuals have an inherent right to prevent
"pointless, even cruel prolongation of the act of dying". Stated in simpler
and more fundamental terms, as a matter of constitutional law, a competent
adult who is incurably-ill has the right, if he so chooses, not to resist death
and to die with dignity .... 171
The New York court then found that the "current state" of the then-
prevailing ethical opinion of the medical profession for the most part affirmed
that a terminally ill patient had the right to refuse treatment, allowing the
disease to follow its natural progression to death.172  The court then
balanced this interest against the four state interests discussed above 73 and
concluded that the right to refuse medical treatment outweighed them all. 74
Although concerned with the right to refuse medical treatment, the
rationale of some of the medical opinions cited by the Eichner court would
also support the right of suicide for the hopelessly ill. For example, the court
found that one authority states that recovery meant more than being alive, but
meant "life without intolerable suffering."' 75 The language in the court's
discussion of the state interest in the preservation and sanctity of life supports
the proposition to allow suicide in the case of certain medical conditions.
Although used in the context of a patient in a permanent vegetative state, the
words surely justify authorized suicide. The court speaks of a patient
171. Id. at 538-39 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 214, 219 (1973); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 137
(Mass. Ct. App. 1978) (footnote omitted).
172. Id. at 542.
173. Id. at 543.
It is not enough, however, simply to declare that the terminally ill patient
in a chronic coma is entitled to refuse further medical treatment. We are
bound by Roe v. Wade... to determine whether the exercise of that right
contravenes some countervailing State interest ... and we therefore
measure the relief requested herein against the four major categories of
relevant State interests.
Id. (citation omitted).
174. "We conclude, therefore, that there were no state interests sufficiently
compelling in this proceeding .... " Id. at 544.
175. Id. at 541 (citing H.P. Lewis, Machine, Medicine and Its Relation to the
Fatally Il, 206 JAMA 387, 389 (1968)).
[Vol. 57
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ensnared by medical technology while waiting for death, who having lived
life, relies on machines to provide his existence.176
Citing another case, the court recognized an "[i]ndividual['s]... inherent
right to prevent pointless, even cruel, prolongation of the act of dying.
'177
Even though the prevention of suicide is one of the four identified state goals,
the discussion comes close to justifying suicide of the incurably-ill person:
The current Penal Law provides for criminal liability solely as to a third
party who aids or promotes the suicide attempt; it does not impose liability
against the individual himself. Hence, there seems to be no public policy
against permitting a terminally ill patient to choose not to delay the
inevitable and imminent termination of his life-at least insofar as public
policy is reflected in the current Penal Law. Such decision, directed to
terminating the artificial prolongation of life, cannot be deemed "irrational
in the sense generally connoted by the term 'suicide'."178
The court then went on to establish the substantive and procedural mechanism
by which the interests of a person in a permanent vegetative state would be
protected.' 79 On review, the Court of Appeals of New York' 80 declined
to find that the right to refuse medical treatment was an aspect of constitution-
al privacy since principles of common law supported the decision.'
IV. FROM PERLMUTER TO BERGSTEDT: ARE WE ALREADY AT THE
JUDICIAL THRESHOLD OF A LIMITED RIGHT TO SUICIDE FOR
COMPETENT, INCURABLE PATIENTS?
Some state court decisions have laid a foundation for finding a limited
right to suicide for competent, incurably-ill adults. Since Cruzan would
probably not change the results of those decided before Cruzan, these cases
are precedent for finding the right to commit suicide.
The first case identified as authorizing a competent person to choose to
discontinue a life sustaining treatment or device on non-religious grounds is
176. Id. at 543.
177. Id. at 538-39 (citing In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978)).
178. Id. at 544 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 544-51.
180. Eichner v. Dillon, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
181. Id. at 70-71. The court of appeals modified the opinion of the lower court
by "deleting everything but the authorization to the petitioner to discontinue use of the
respirator." Id. at 74.
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Satz v. Perlmutter."8  Because of his illness, amyotrophic lateral sclero-
sis,"83 Mr. Perlmutter was being kept alive by a respirator.'1 4 Even on the
respirator, Mr. Perlmutter had but a short time to live."8 The respirator
placed in his trachea made him "miserable" and he wanted it removed even
though his life expectancy without it was no more than one hour.1' 6 The
court, in reviewing the order of the trial judge which had ordered the
respirator removed, relied heavily on Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz.'s7
The Florida court went on to find that none of the four governmental
interests announced in Saikewicz were controlling."M As to the interest in
preserving life the court seemed to place great weight on Mr. Perlmutter's
condition being terminal. 89 The protection of third parties as a government
purpose was easily brushed aside because no one was dependent on Mr.
Perlmutter. 9°
The prevention of suicide proved to be more difficult. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that
182. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The Florida fourth district court
of appeals approved the order of a trial judge that allowed a competent but terminally
ill adult suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease) to have
his caregivers remove the respirator that was keeping him alive.
183. This malady is commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease.
184. At times, cour6 refer to these devices as ventilators. For consistency, we
will refer to them as "respirators."
185. Satz, 362 So. 2d at 161.
186. Id.
187. Id. The Florida district court of appeal recognized that the pros and cons are
exhaustively disbussed in [Saikewicz] and thus the court adopted "the view of the line
of cases discussed in Saikewicz which would allow Abe Perlmutter the right to refuse
or discontinue treatment based upon 'the constitutional right to privacy ... an
expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self determination."'
Id. at 162 (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977)).
188. The four are 1) interest in preserving life; 2) the need to protect innocent
third parties; 3) duty to prevent suicide; and 4) the requirement that it help maintain
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
189. "In the case at bar the condition is terminal, the patient's situation wretched
and the continuation of his life temporary and totally artificial" Satz, 362 So. 2d at
162. One is left to wonder what the court would have done had Mr. Perlmutter's
condition been "wretched" but not terminal. The court, of course, limited its decision
to the facts before it. Id. It should be noted that only on the question of preservation
of life did the court suggest that it was using strict scrutiny. "We see no compelling
state interest." Id. at 162.
190. "We point out that Abe Perlmutter is 73, his family adult and all in
agreement with his wishes." Id.
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[i]t is true that [being disconnected from the respirator] appears more drastic
[than refusing the initiation of treatment] because affirmatively, a mechani-
cal device must be disconnected, as distinct from mere inaction. Notwith-
standing, the principle is the same, for in both instances the hapless, but
mentally competent, victim is choosing not to avail himself of one of the
expensive marvels of modem medical science.' 9'
On the last issue, the integrity of the medical profession, the court adopted the
exact language of Saikewicz.192
The substantive concluding paragraph of the court's opinion would
appear to go far towards providing a justification for suicide.
It is our conclusion, therefore, under the facts before us, that when these
several public policy interests are weighed against the rights of Mr.
Perlmutter, the latter must and should prevail. Abe Perlmutter should be
allowed to make his choice to die with dignity, notwithstanding over a
dozen legislative failures in this state to adopt suitable legislation in this
field. It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life
so that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and
no possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another matter
to do so at the patient's sole expense and against his competent will, thus
inflicting never ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but
artificially suspended, moment of death. Such a course of conduct invades
191. Id. at 163. As the court pointed out, with the respirator removed, Mr.
Perlmutter would die of natural causes. Id. at 162.
192. Id. at 163-64.
The last State interest requiring discussion is that of the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession as well as allowing hospitals the
full opportunity to care for people under their control. The force and
impact of this interest is lessened by the prevailing medical ethical
standards. Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception,
demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstanc-
es. Rather, as indicated in Quinlan, the prevailing ethical practice seems
to be to recognize that the dying are more often in need of comfort than
treatment. Recognition of the right to refuse necessary treatment in
appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores; such
a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medical profession,
the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest
in protecting the same. It is not necessary to deny a right of self-determina-
tion to a patient in order to recognize the interests of doctors, hospitals, and
medical personnel in attendance on the patient. Also, if the doctrines of
informed consent and right of privacy have as their foundations the right to
bodily integrity, and control of one's own fate, then those rights are
superior to the institutional considerations.
Id. (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27) (citations omitted).
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the patient's constitutional right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice
and invades his right to self-determine. 1
93
Bartling v. Superior Court'94is similar in many ways to Satz v.
Perlmutter. It involved a patient on a respirator, but the patient had "not been
diagnosed as terminal. 195 This, of course, differs from Mr. Perlmutter who
had been so diagnosed.196 However, like Mr. Perlmutter, Mr. Bartling
"wanted to live but ... not ... on the [respirator].197  And, like Mr.
Perlmutter, he realized that if the respirator were removed he would likely
die.' 98 After determining that Mr. Bartling was competent,'9 the court
weighed his right to refuse medical treatment against the four state interests
first set out in detail in Saikewicz.'°  Of prime importance were the state
interests in preserving life and the prevention of suicide. As to the former, the
court quoted from the opinion of the Florida court in Satz v. Perlmutter.201
It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that
there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and no
possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another matter to
do so at the patient's sole expense and against his competent will, thus
inflicting never ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but
artificially suspended, moment of death. Such a course of conduct invades
the patient's constitutional right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice
and invades his right to self determination.2 2
As to suicide, the California court found that "[t]his is not a case, however,
where real parties would have brought about Mr. Bartling's death by unnatural
means by disconnecting the ventilator. Rather, they would merely have
hastened his inevitable death by natural causes.''
193. Id. at 164.
194. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
195. Id.
196. Satz, 362 So. 2d at 161.
197. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 224. These are, it will be recalled, the preservation of life, the need
to protect innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and maintaining the ethics
of the medical profession. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 417 (recognized as the source
of these four interests by the California court).
201. 362 So. 2d 160.
202. Barding, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (quoting Satz, 362 So.2d at 164).
203. Id. at 225.
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In Bouvia v. Superior Court,'20 the California Court of Appeal ruled
that a competent patient had the right to refuse the further use of a feeding
tube even though she would in all likelihood starve without the nutrition and
hydration received by way of the tube.2 During the course of reaching its
decision the court came to several conclusions that are helpful to the case we
wish to make. First, the court stated that in weighing the right to refuse
medical treatment against the state interest in preserving life, the quality of
that life was a consideration.206
The court in finding that the patient's wishes regarding the tube did not
amount to an attempt to commit suicide, commented that the "desire to
terminate one's life is probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to
privacy .... "207
Although concurring in the court's opinion, Justice Compton would have
gone further.
This state and the medical profession instead of frustrating [Bouvia's
preference for death over her present circumstances] should be attempting
to relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die with
ease and dignity. The fact that she is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-
starvation to achieve her object is in itself inhumane.
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies
so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right should, in my
opinion, include the ability to enlist assistance from others, including the
medical profession, in making death as painless and quick as possible. 20
In the time that has passed since Justice Compton's concurring opinion, at
least two state courts have gone part way down the path he suggested. In
State v. McAfee,' the Georgia Supreme Court found that McAfee was
entitled to have the respirator keeping him alive removed.2 0  The court,
however, went further and held that "Mr. McAfee's right to be free from
pain21' at the time the [respirator] is disconnected is inseparable from his
204. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
205. Id. at 300.
206. "[T]he trial court mistakenly attached undue importance to the amount of
time possibly available to the petitioner, and failed to give equal weight and
consideration for the quality of that life; an equal, if not more significant consider-
ation." Id. at 304.
207. Id. at 306.
208. Id. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring).
209. 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989).
210. Id. at 652.
211. "The record shows that Mr. McAfee has attempted to disconnect his
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right to refuse medical treatment.2 12 This led to the holding that "[h]is right
to have a sedative (a medication that in no way causes or accelerates death)
administered before the [respirator] is disconnected is a part of his right to
control his medical treatment."
213
This humane addition to the right of a person like McAfee to refuse life
sustaining treatment has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Nevada in
McKay v. Bergtedt.
214
In all cases decided by a district court in favor of the patient, the court's
order shall specify that any physician or health care provider who assists the
patient in receiving the benefits of his or her decision with minimal pain,
shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability. In the latter regard, we
agree with the court in State v. McAfee that a patient's "right to be free
from pain at the time the ventilator [or other life support system] is
disconnected is inseparable from his right to refuse medical treatment."215
V. THE IMPACT ON SOCIETY
Section IV laid the foundation for the right to commit suicide. Because
this issue is not principally a legal question, it is necessary to examine the
impact that such decision has on society.
Throughout history, it is clear, both through writing and through judicial
opinions, that an individual has the right to control his body. This right
includes the right io consent to and to refuse medical treatment, 2 6 and to
make all relevant decisions concerning his health.17 The decision in cases.
such as these are decisions that affect only him. 218 It is well settled since
Cruzan that one does have the right to refuse medical treatment when he has
a condition from which there is no recovery. 219 For this right to be
[respirator] in the past, but has been unable to do so due to the severe pain he suffers
when deprived of oxygen." Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (quoting McAfee, 385 S.E.2d at 652).
215. Id. at 631 (quoting McAfee, 385 S.E.2d at 652).
216. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
217. Id. at 11.
218. See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987) (decision is a personal one).
Opponents would argue that more than just the individual would be affected. Like
ripples from a stone dropped in a pond, the relatives would be greatly affected and
society, slightly affected. But see Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla.
1989); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(competent adult allowed to refuse life-saving blood transfusion on religious grounds).
219. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2851-52 (1990).
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meaningful, it now must be recognized that a person has a constitutional right
to have total control, including the right to take affirmative action to end his
life. If he is faced with a condition from which there can be no recovery, he
has a right to refuse treatment. Without more, he may be sentenced, then, to
an existence of suffering and pain, a life that only has duration, a life that has
no quality or meaning to that individual.22 Quality of life is as important,
if not more so, than length of life. 1
Who shall say what the minimum amount of available life must be? Does
it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months, or 15 to 20 days, if such
life has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone?
As in all matters lines must be drawn at some point, somewhere, but that
222decision must ultimately belong to the one whose life is in issue.
If society does not recognize an individual's right to take affirmative
action to end his life when he is suffering from a condition from which there
can be no recovery, a condition that is incurable, his right to control his body
is hollow, and he is sentenced to a "life" that is inhumane. These are cases
that are concerned with morality. m
"Society" abhors suicide; 4 it was a crime against society.25 If
suicide were sanctioned, the very fiber of society would crumble and people
would take their lives inappropriately.226 What is morality, then, if society
allows an individual with an incurable condition to suffer endlessly, in great
pain, and waste away in agony, wishing for death?' Courts, in deciding the
220. See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 624 (Nev. 1990) ("[W]here
prospects for a life of quality are smothered by physical pain and suffering, only the
sufferer can determine the value of continuing mortality.").
221. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
accord McKay, 801 P.2d at 623.
222. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
223. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), cert. granted,
354 A.2d 326 (N.J. 1975), modified and remanded, 355 A. 2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
224. There is no right to commit suicide. McKay, 801 P.2d at 626.
225. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 (Mass.
1986) (Nolan, J. dissenting) ("Suicide is direct self-destruction and is intrinsically
evil.").
226. Suicide concerns "irrational self-destruction." Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (Mass. 1977).
227. An example of such is a person in the end stages of AIDS or cancer. Is
society more moral for allowing these individuals to suffer, waiting for a release from
pain and suffering, or would society be more moral if it allowed such a person to end
his own life? As the Bouvia court states:
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right to die cases most usually discuss the state's interest in preventing
suicide" and find it not applicable to the facts of the case because either
removal of life-prolonging procedures simply allows the disease to take its
natural course, the condition was not self-inflicteduo or the individual
wants to live, free of the medical device. The state interest in preventing
suicide stems from the view that suicide is "irrational self-destruction""ui and




Such is not the case here. The patient is incurably-ill and is making an
informed decision, based on his physical condition. Society's concern is
with physical existence, rather than quality of life. Society now focuses on
how many days an individual can be maintained on a feeding tube734 instead
of on the supportive services available to help the patient maximize the quality
Who shall say what the minimum amount of available life must be? Does
it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months, or 15 to 20 days, if such
life has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone?
As in all matters lines must be drawn at some point, somewhere, but that
decision must ultimately belong to the one whose life is in issue.
Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
228. With the exception of the court in Saikewicz, the opinions just mention in
passing the state interest in suicide without explaining the basis for the interest. See,
e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986)
("Prevention of suicide is... an inapplicable consideration.. .") (citing In re Colyer,
660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983)).
229. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955 (Me. 1987).
230. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 685 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc); In re
Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 n.6 (N.Y. 1981).
231. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 627 (Nev. 1990).
232. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426
n.11 (Mass. 1977).
233. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987) (quoting In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985)). The McKay court noted that, for example, for
individuals cofitemplating suicide because they were depressed "our societal regard for
the value of an individual's life, as reflected in our Federal and State Constitutions
would never countenance an assertion of liberty over life under such circumstances."
McKay, 801 P.2d at 625.
234. In the Cruzan case, there was testimony that Nancy Cruzan could live
approximately thirty years being maintained by this feeding tube. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 n.1 (1990).
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of his life.? 5 Society has forgotten to ask or honor whether the individual
wants this kind of life.? 6
Preserving life at all costs, that is, using extreme medical resources rather
than usual medical treatment, is to turn a blind eye to the fact that death is a
natural part of life.? 7 Death serves an important role in living. It ends
"prolonged suffering.. .[,] the indignities associated with life bereft of self-
determination and cognitive activit[ies] ... ."23' The patient is robbed of
dignity; the family suffers longer, and final memories are of tubes, machines--
a physical wasting away, rather than of the patient's true character? 9
An individual has a liberty interest in his body.m° Because this is a
liberty interest, his interest is not an absolute one and can be balanced against
state interests.241 When he has a condition from which there is no recovery,
he has only the prospect of a worsening condition, pain, suffering, and
ultimately death, then there is no possible state interest that can outweigh his
interest in terminating his life when his life no longer has sufficient quality to
him.2 42 As pointed out by the court in Saikewicz
The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require little if any
discussion. In the case of the competent adult's refusing medical treatment
such an act does not necessarily constitute suicide since (1) in refusing
treatment the patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even
if he did, to the extent that the cause of death was from natural causes the
patient did not set the death producing agent in motion with the intent of
causing his own death. Furthermore, the underlying State interest in this
area lies in the prevention of irrational self-destruction. What we consider
here is a competent, rational decision to refuse treatment when death is
inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of cure or preservation of life.
235. The Cruzan opinion also contained testimony that the state was maintaining
Nancy Beth Cruzan at the taxpayers' expense. Id. at 2846.
236. "[W]e attach great significance to the quality of Kenneth's life as he
perceived it under the particular circumstances that were afflicting him." McKay, 801
P.2d at 625.
237. Id. at 622.
238. Id. at 622-23.
239. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2873 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., & Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
240. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7.
241. Id. at 2852; McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617,622 (Nev. 1990) (Rights not
absolute and subject to balancing of relevant state interests).
242. The quality of life must be viewed from the individual's point of view.
McKay, 801 P.2d at 624. Factors to consider include the amount of pain the individual
is suffering, the physical limitations on the individual, the painfulness or invasiveness
of the treatments that the individual must undergo, etc. For a discussion of criteria that
could be considered, see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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There is no connection between the conduct here in issue and any State
concern to prevent suicide.u 3
The number of people who have incurable conditions but who can be
kept alive by extraordinary measures is ever increasing.2' Many times,
such measures simply maintain a life without any quality.24 5 If the right to
control one's life is significant, it must include, in conditions where there is
no hope for recovery, the right to take affirmative steps to end one's life.
"[A]t some point in the life of a competent adult patient, the present or
prospective quality of life may be so dismal" that an individual's interest
outweighs the state's.246 Where "a life of quality" is obliterated by "pain
and suffering," only the individual can decide whether life is worth continued
living.u 7 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court still noted that a state can ignore
an individual's quality of life and assert an "unqualified interest" in preserving
life that is to be balanced against the individual's interest.21 Yet, where the
individual is competent, incurably-ill and dependent on life-prolonging
procedures, and suffering physically and mentally, his "right to decide will
generally outweigh the State's interest in preserving life." 49
Society still views suicide as inappropriateY0o Although active
243. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,426
n.11 (Mass. 1977) (citations omitted); accord In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955 (Me.
1987) ("[D]ecision to live without artificial life-sustaining procedures would not
constitute suicide since the grievous injuries... were not self-inflicted.").
244. McKay, 801 P.2d at 628.
245. Id. at 628 ("[S]uch efforts ... delay death in a bodily environment
essentially bereft of quality").
246. Id. at 624.
247. Id.
248. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990).
Note that the dissent in the Missouri Supreme Court's Cruzan opinion found that "[it
is unrealistic to say that the preservation of life is an absolute, without regard to the
quality of life .... It is appropriate to consider the quality of life in making decisions
about the extraordinary medical treatment." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 429
(Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
249. McKay, 801 P.2d at 624.
250. States would need to enact legislation that decriminalizes aiding and abetting
a competent adult's suicide when that competent adult has a condition from which
there can be no recovery and the condition has advanced to a point where the
individual has determined that the ending of the individual's life is preferable to
continued existence. For example, in Satz, Mr. Perlmutter had Lou Gehrig's disease
and was unable to move. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 160, 360-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). The issue of aiding and abetting is an important one, but beyond the
scope of this Article. That is not to say that an adult may be competent but physically
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euthanasia2' or aiding and abetting a suicide is considered a crime, it is
clearly done. Sometimes society doesn't punish those individuals alleged to
have aided or abetted a suicide. 2 Yet individuals who are in the best
position to help a loved one take the steps necessary to end his suffering are
reluctant to do so when it is "legally wrong.'253
An incurably-ill, competent individual has an arguable right to commit
suicide. Society and the courts must address this issue.254 Several courts
have come to the brink of holding that an incurable patient has the right to
commit suicide.2 5 Society must recognize its obligation to support such a
unable, for example, to put the pills in his mouth. Individuals in situations such as
that will need help. Additionally, it needs to become beyond question for a doctor to
prescribe the appropriate amount of medication necessary for the individual to take his
own life.
251. For the purposes of this Article, the phrase active euthanasia means acting
in some way to hasten death such as through the administration of a lethal dosage of
drugs.
252. In fact, euthanasia or assisted suicide is not a recent idea. See Herbert
Stephen, Murder From the Best Motives, 5 LAW Q. REV. 188-89 (1889) (concerning
whether a doctor should practice euthanasia); Theodore Sachs, Recent Case, 48 MICH.
L. REv. 1199-1201 (1950) (euthanasia or mercy-killing); Nancy Gibbs, Dr. Death
Strikes Again, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 78 (reporting that a Michigan judge last year
decided not to prosecute Dr. Jack Kevorkian because the state has no law against
assisted suicide); Jane Meinhart, Helping Dying Along; Crime or Act of Love?, ST.
PEERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 19,1991, § A, at 1-2; David J. Rothman, LetJudges Weigh
Patients' Request for 'Assisted Death', L.A. DAILY J., May 10, 1991, at 6; Jury Won't
Indict Doctor, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 27, 1991, § A, at 13. But see People v.
Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant convicted of second
degree murder for assisting AIDS patient's suicide); Griffith v. State, 548 So. 2d 244
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) affd in part, quashed in part, 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1990),
on remand, 571 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (convicted of first degree
murder for "mercy killing" of daughter in vegetative state); Gilbert v. State, 487 So.
2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (75 year old man convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment for "mercy killing" his wife).
253. The voters in the state of Washington voted down Initiative 119 that
proposed legalization of doctor-assisted suicides. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 7,
1991, § A, at 16. Two legislators in New Hampshire have introduced a bill to allow
terminally ill individuals to commit suicide, but not doctor assisted suicide. National
Digest, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 13, 1991, § A, at 4.
254. In a survey conducted by the I.C.R. Survey Research Group for Maturity
News Service, 51% of those surveyed responded that euthanasia (defined as painlessly
putting to death a person with a incurable disease) was a personal choice. Roper
Center for Public Op'n Research, U. of Conn. 1990. A suicide initiative has yet to be
approved by voters. See supra note 253.
255. See supra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.
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decision rather than to add to the patient's burden. Society must allocate
money for dignity and comfort for the dying rather than money for the
incurable patient"z 6 Rather than maintaining a terminally ill patient with a
feeding tube, society should use those resources to help that individual die in
dignity and comfort. Chronically-ill older people do commit suicide.z7
Too many times resources are misdirected.z 8 It is time for society to
look to the best stewardship of the resources and to permit individuals to have
control over the quality of their own lives, as well as the quantity of days.
It is also important to realize that recognition of the right to commit
suicide when irreversibly ill is not a basis to compel the deaths of those who
do not desire to commit suicide, ill or not. Improved medical technology has
changed the face of death. "Highly invasive treatment" maintain the
rudiments of life by merging "body and machine that some might reasonably
regard as a insult to life rather than" continuing it.259
It has also changed the environment in which people die, from at home
surrounded by family to "relatively public places, such as hospital or nursing
homes."
256. See Carol Gentry, More Care, Less Cure Suggested, ST. PETERSBURG TiMES,
Sept. 12, 1991, § B, at 1, 6.
257. Suicide rate for the elderly is increasing, study says. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1991, § A, at 5. Derek Humphrey's book, FINAL Exrr is a best seller. See
also Peter Kent, Final Exit offers solution to individuals, not society, ATLANTA J.,
Aug. 19, 1991, § A, at 12. Older people have the highest rate of suicide of any age-
based group. Characteristics of Elderly Suicide, 2 BROWN U. LONG-TERM CARE
LETTER, July 23, 1990, at 7.
258. As a result, people may not be able to be treated unless they have the money
to pay a significant deposit. Society needs to place its health care dollars where the
most good will be accomplished. The dissent in the Missouri Supreme Court's Cruzan
decision referred to a case of a judge who required extraordinary treatment which the
hospital would not provide without a substantial deposit, and noted that many die for
lack of available medical care. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 429 (Mo. 1988)
(en banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
259. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2883 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Id. In a footnote, Justice Stevens noted
"Until the latter part of this century, medicine had relatively little
treatment to offer the dying and the vast majority of persons died at home
rather than in the hospital." Brief for American Medical Association et. al.
asAmici Curiae 6. "In 1985, 83% of deaths [of] Americans age 65 or over
occurred in a hospital or nursing home. Sager, Easterling, et al., Changes
in the Location of Death After Passage of Medicare's Prospective Payment
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Competent adults, who have managed their lives fully and completely, now.
suddenly find, at the end of their lives, a complete loss of control. Their final
days can be a bewildering, dehumanizing mix of machines, tubes and
specialists. What benefit is served an individual who is incurably-ill and who
has decided that the time has come for him to die? When he no longer
desires treatment and it can do more help for others, society needs to turn to
other alternatives6 1 to assist him.
But stopping treatment does not mean immediate death. 2 In some
instances ceasing treatment means a quick death; other diseases dictate
lingering and painful illness. Individuals with those diseases must be granted
the right to a quick and peaceful death by giving them the right to act
affirmatively to end their lives. Society must give the incurably-ill the right
to decide to live or to die.? In these cases, no state interest could outweigh
the individual's. A state's opposition to such act is more symbolic than
actual.2 4
VI. THE DANGERS OF SUICIDE
A variety of arguments can be put forward that permitting suicide is
inappropriate. It is important to address a few of the most frequent concerns
about the right to commit suicide.
The slippery slope or wedge argument is the most often used in
According to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research:
"Just as recent years have seen alterations in the underlying causes of
death, the places where people die change in where very ill patients are
treated permits health care professionals to marshall the instruments of
scientific medicine more effectively. But people who are dying may well
find such a setting alienating and unsupportive." Deciding to Forego Life-
Sustaining Treatment 17-18 (1983) (footnotes omitted), quoting Thomas,
Dying as Failure, 447 Annals Am.Acad.Pol. & Soc.Sci. 1, 3 (1980).
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2883 n.11.
261. The court in McKay found that the patient should be informed of available
support services. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev. 1990).
262. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 17 (Fla. 1990) (death would
occur 4-9 days after feeding tube's removal).
263. After Initiative 119 was defeated, Claude Pendell committed suicide with a
shotgun blast to his head. Mr. Pendell had a variety of health problems, including
leukemia and diabetes. His doctor had agreed to help him die if the initiative had
passed. Right To Die Fails; Rancher Kills Self, AP, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Nov. 22,
1991, § A, at 8.
264. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. For a more extensive discussion of this, see JAMES RACHELS, THE END OF
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opposition to termination of treatment or permitting suicide. Under that
argument, society is heading down a "slippery slope" that will lead to
selectively-enforced decisions about who lives and who dies based upon an
individual's utility to society. Sanctioning suicide will lead society further
down the slippery slope than is permitted. By permitting incurable individuals
to commit suicide, it is feared society will encourage those who have no
utility to society and who are burdens to society to end their lives.
The slippery slope argument fails to take into account that the current
social state of affairs is such that the incurably-ill are often left unsupported
and unassisted in the very life society wants them to continue. 266 A more
appropriate response for society is to recognize that the usual course of
treatment is more correct for these individuals than an extreme course of
treatment. This means that society, for these individuals, should direct its
resources and attention toward true supportive care in order that an individ-
ual's life quality be maximized rather than denying the right of the individual
to end his life when it becomes intolerable.267
Broader social prohibitions against suicide are invoked by the fear that
to permit any taking of life is to devalue the human experience and would
lead down the slippery slope to selective extermination. Our society currently
condones the taking of life only in war, self-defensem and legal execu-
tions,269 situations which are designed to preserve social integrity and which
do not address individual suffering. The inherent vagueness of any language
that would permit suicide by the dying would perhaps open the door to abuses
society cannot afford to condone at any level.270
The social injunctions against suicide by the terminally ill, however, have
not been addressed in light of modern American culture, polyethnicity, and
medical practice. It is not clear how the prevention of suffering by permitting
suicide by the incurably-ill will be more damaging to the social fabric than
permitting wholesale killing in a war, both of which are suspensions of the
otherwise rigid prohibition against the intentional taking of life. To the
contrary, some commentators argue that addressing the problem of relieving
LIFE 170-80 (1976).
266. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989).
267. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d at 652.
268. See, e.g., RACHELS, supra note 265, at 12.
269. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1990).
270. Peter Stalinsky, Euthanasia and The American College of Physicians Ethics
Manual, 112 ANN. INT. MED. 312 (1990). An example of unacceptable abuse would
be a doctor euthanizing a patient without the patient's request. See, e.g., Peter
Steinfels, Dutch Study IsIssue In Euthanasia Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1991, § 1, at
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human suffering when it is intolerable and incurable by permitting the
individual the choice of ending life elevates rather than diminishes the human
experience; it focuses directly on the individual's values, pain, and right to
determine when he has suffered enough.271
A possibility of misdiagnosis is also raised as another reason to prohibit
suicide. Misdiagnosis is a concern about the real possibility of factual error
on which a decision may ultimately be based. Such concerns are better
directed toward drafting appropriate statutory safeguards to insure an
individual has complete medical information from which to act rather than
being used as a basis to deny a constitutionally-based right. Further, as
defined in the context of this Article, the incurably-ill are familiar both with
diagnosis and prognosis, so that concerns for misdiagnosis, if not eliminated
altogether, are necessarily quite limited.
Moral, political,272 and religious arguments2'73 are also used but do not
constitute legal arguments. These arguments have a place in the debate and
in individual decision-making, but are insufficient grounds to deny this right.
The most persuasive argument against permitting suicide is the possibility
that the individual might change his mind,274 which is undeniably true.
Once again, our Constitution permits individuals to make irrevocable decisions
that they later regret or wanted to change. Statutory safeguards will protect
an individual who decides to commit suicide, but the mere prospect that an
individual might change his mind is insufficient to deny the right altogether,
particularly to those who do not.275
Any discussion about the permissibility of suicide by incurably-ill
patients necessarily raises the question of the role of the medical profession
in such cases and the impact on the medical profession of permitting suicide
271. Physician assistance in this case advances self-determination and diminishes
human suffering. Marcia Angell, Euthanasia, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1348 (1989).
272. See Hadley Arkes, et al., 'Always to Care, Never to Kill', WALL ST. J., Nov.
27, 1991, § A, at 8 (excerpts from a declaration on euthanasia).
273. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
274. State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651,652 (Ga. 1989); Bouvia v. Superior Court,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). As of December 27, 1990, Elizabeth
Bouvia is still alive. She had agreed to accept liquid nourishment. WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1990, § A, at 1.
Mr. McAfee has received special computer equipment and entered a special
employment program and was attempting to find a job. According to his mother, he
had not changed his mind about ending his life. Duane Riner & Ben Smith III,
Quadriplegic Choosing Not to Pull Plug, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 18, 1990, § C, at 1.
275. Note that, in an interview with McAfee's mother, she stated he had not
changed his mind. See supra note 274.
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by the incurably-ill. Recent polls indicate that a majority of the American
public supports the right to elect suicide in limited circumstances.276
Public perception is not a valid measure of the rights of any individual,
but it must of necessity speak to both the arguments of policy and tradition
opposing suicide. It is clear that monolithic and unquestioning opposition to
voluntary suicide is rejected by a large proportion of the American public.
Debate has begun and will continue with respect to the circumstances, if any,
in which voluntary suicide is appropriate and should be permitted. Discussion
will necessarily follow about the propriety of physician assistance in voluntary
suicide. To what degree the medical profession participates in the discussion
will determine the impact of this volatile subject on the medical profession.
It is as impossible to assign a single reaction to the prospect of permitting
suicide for the incurably-ill among physicians as it is for any other group.
The discussions of euthanasia, assisted suicide, and termination of life-
supporting treatment, however, have long been linked in the medical
literature.2 "n A brisk debate has already begun within the medical profession
regarding the wisdom, morality, and practical effects of permitting and
assisting voluntary suicide by the incurably-ill.278
No single organization represents a majority of American physicians.
The American Medical Association, however, has long been considered the
primary source of official positions by the profession on a wide variety of
subjects. In 1989, the AMA issued a policy statement on euthanasia through
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, which strongly condemned
physician assistance in euthanasia, on grounds of public policy, moral values
and medical tradition.279 Expounding the position of the American Medical
276. In the days leading up to the Washington state initiative on assisted suicide,
the results of a number of independent polls were published. As many as 68% of the
American public were reported to support assisted suicide by the terminally ill. Ellen
Debenport, Euthanasia Measure For Terminally Ill Is Defeated, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, § A, at 16. A Gallup poll showed two-thirds of Americans
support the right of a terminally ill patient to commit suicide. A Boston Globe poll
showed 71% of Catholics favoring assisted suicide. David Von Drehle, Suicide
Initiative Defeated, Not Dead. Euthanasia Seen As Gaining Acceptance in U.S.,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991, § A, at 25.
277. Some commentators suggest that there is no moral difference between
voluntary suicide and termination of life support. In both instances, the intent is a
merciful death and cessation of suffering for the incurably ill patient. Angell, supra
note 271, at 1350.
278. The New England Journal of Medicine, for example, has regularly received
passionate letters, pro and con, following any publication of essays or articles on
assisted suicide, termination of treatment and the role of physicians in death and dying.
See, e.g., Jo Anne Lynn, Euthanasia (letters), 321 NEW ENO. J. MED. 119-20 (1989).
279. REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMA:
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Association, David Orentlicher, the Ethics and Health Policy Counsel, stated
that the goal of the medical profession is to sustain life and relieve suffer-
ing.2m Physician participation in voluntary suicide, therefore, is wrong
because physicians could not ethically choose a course of action, the primary
purpose of which is to cause death rather than preserve life. Even discussion
of the subject of suicide might convey the impression that the physician
approves of suicide and unnecessarily sway patients into accepting this option
over others. 81  Thus, the most conservative position endorsed by the
American Medical Association not only would preclude physician participation
in voluntary suicide, but any physician discussions of the matter with the
patient.
Other objections to physician participation in patient suicide focus on
traditional medical obligations outlined in the Hippocratic Oath, which
specifically forbids the assistance of physicians in suicide.8 z  Many
commentators raise concerns that physicians who openly discuss assisted
suicide with patients will erode public trust in the profession, because of the
fear that a healer cannot also assist in procuring death.8 3 Less-frequently
raised objections are that assisted suicide will have a disproportionate effect
on the poor,2 or that it will frustrate medical research because the
terminally ill will simply not be visible to stimulate interest and energies in
discovering cures.8 5 These objections are based, again, on arguments of
EUTHANASIA, CHICAGO, ILL. (1989).
280. David Orentlicher, Physician Participation In Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA
1844-45 (1989).
281. Id. at 1844.
282. The Hippocratic Oath clearly prohibits physician participation in suicide with
its injunction: I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked nor suggest any such
counsel. It is often assumed that all physicians swear the Hippocratic Oath upon
graduation from medical school. In fact, the traditional oath, which also appeals to
Apollo and all of the gods, and prohibits cutting for stone and abortion, as well as
charging a fee for teaching students the art of medicine, is often abandoned in favor
of a more modem version reflective of changed medical procedures and ethics.
Alternatively, the Oath of Miamonides is also used for these same reasons. Despite
the oath, there has been a practice of physician-assisted suicide. Darrell Amundsen,
Physician Obligation To Prolong Life: A Medical Duty Without Classical Roots,
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Aug. 1978, at 23.
283. See Matthew Conolly, Euthanasia, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 119-20 (1989);
Samuel F. Hunter, Active Euthanasia Violates Fundamental Principles, 262 JAMA
3074 (1989); TheAmerican College ofPhysiciansEthicsManual, 111 ANN. INT. MED.
245-252, 327-35 (1989).
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tradition, basic moral values or public policy, and are insufficient to overcome
a constitutional right.
Recently, the willingness of commentators to challenge these objections
which underlie traditional objections to suicide in the medical context
increased as a result of medical and legal discussions surrounding the right of
patients to refuse life prolonging treatment and from increasing public
frustration with a perceived loss of control over the process of dying.2
There is a growing perception on the part of patients and physicians alike that
the medical profession has strayed from a dedication to patient interests to a
position of preserving life per se.? Some commentators have gone so far
as to suggest that the very sterility of modem medical practice is the basis for
the increasing discussion of euthanasia. 'If there were more individualized
caring for and relief of suffering, rather than concentration on extending life,
the public demand for assistance in dying might diminish.' Fear of
suffering, rather than of death, appears to be a central factor in discussions of
assisted suicide. 9
Although it is commonly asserted that medical tradition has historically
opposed suicide by the terminally ill, this does not appear to be entirely true.
It is well established that Greek and Roman physicians, even those who were
Hippocratic, often supplied their patients the means to commit suicide, despite
the injunction against assistance in suicide embodied in the Hippocratic
oath.2m This practice has continued, though not officially recognized, to the
present. 91 Instances of physicians moved by their patients' pleas and
286. See, e.g., Debenport, supra note 276, at 16. An opinion poll conducted by
the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press reported a 6-1 majority support
for the right of the patient to decide about life-prolonging procedures. Sara Engram,
Letting Go OfLife, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 17, 1990, § D, at 4.
287. See Christine K. Cassel & Diane Meier, Morals and Moralism in the Debate
Over Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 750-52 (1990). This
same thinking dominated termination of treatment cases for a number of years, until
ethical debate forced a reassessment of the interest in preserving life per se. Courts
and statutes which regulate termination of life-supporting treatment are beginning to
shift from an emphasis on preserving life per se to the a patient-centered focus which
allows incorporation of the patient's individual wishes, beliefs and medical condition
as the basis for decision-making. See, e.g., Rebecca Morgan & Barbara Harty-Golder,
Constitutional Development of Judicial Criteria In Right-To-Die cases: From Brain
Dead to Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 721 (1988).
288. Id. See also Angell, supra note 271, at 1349.
289. Cassel & Meier, supra note 287, at 752. ,
290. Steven Beeson, Euthanasia and the American College of Physicians Ethics
Manual, (letter) 111 ANN. INT. MED. 952-53 (1989) (quoting S.B. NULAND, DocroRs:
THE BIOGRAPHY OF MEDICINE (Alfred Knopf ed. 1988).
291. The publication of "It's Over, Debbie" 259 JAMA 272 (1988) provoked a
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predicaments to assist them in dying have been regularly reported, and
relatively infrequently punished. 9  Further, the practice of permitting
patients, in concert with their physicians, to choose medical therapy which
minimizes pain at the cost of shortening life has long been not only tolerated
but encouraged. 3  Finally, recent polls indicate that 60% of physicians
favor assistance in dying by the terminally ill, although less than half would
feel comfortable assisting a patient in committing suicide.294
The Dutch have the most experience in this forum although they have
never legalized assisting suicide of the incurably-ill. 2 5 Even so, assisting
suicide is relatively more common than in the United States, and performed
under well-defined guidelines.296 The Institute of Medical Ethics set up a
"working party" to study the question of "whether and in what circumstances
it is ethical to hasten their [incurably-ill patients'] death by administration of
narcotic drugs." 7 The majority view of that committee determined that
[a] doctor, acting in good conscience, is ethically justified in assisting death
if the need to relieve intense and unceasing pain or distress caused by an
firestorm of controversy over the existence and propriety of physician-assisted suicide,
but proved that, in fact, .physicians continue to assist patients in ending their lives in
some instances.
292. See Dennis Brodeur, Is a Decision io Forego Tube Feeding For Another a
Decision to Kill?, 6 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 385-94 (1991) (referencing "It's Over,
Debbie"); see also supra note 252.
293. See Charles Culhane, Ethicist: Helping Terminally Ill Commit Suicide Can
Be Acceptable, 34 AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 14, 1991, at .8(1) (noting that the AMA as
well as other medical organizations have generally agreed that "all appropriate means"
should be used "to relieve a patient's pain, even when death might result."); see also
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
294. Angell, supra note 271, at 1349.
295. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
296. Dutch physicians impose these guidelines for assisted suicide:
(1) The patient must be competent to make the decision.
(2) The request for assistance in committing suicide must be
voluntary, consistent and repeated over time, and must be well documented.
(3) The patient must be suffering intolerably with no prospect of
relief, though terminal illness is not a prerequisite.
(4) Two physicians, one of them not connected with the case, must
agree to perform the assistance, usually with the injection of curare after
sleep induced by barbiturates.
Angell, supra note 271, at 1349.
297. Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life
and Assisting Death, Assisted Death, 336 THE LANcETr, Sept. 8, 1990, at 610.
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incurable illness greatly outweighs the benefit to the patient of further
prolonging his life.298
This standard applied when the patient had repeatedly stated his wish to die
and would be given greater weight than an opposing position.2' Assisting
suicide would be justified only when the doctor had verified that the patient's
condition could not be relieved through other medical procedures or social
services.3°
Initiatives to permit assisting suicide in this country have generally
included similar restrictions and safeguards.30 1 In fact, the recent failure of
the Washington state initiative has been attributed, in part, to insufficiently-
clear restrictions and safeguards to prevent the abuses feared by those
opposing the concept of permitting suicide by the terminally ill.
302
It is clear that public discussion of the concept of permitting suicide by
the terminally ill will continue for some time to come 0 3  The medical
profession has historically given lip service in opposition to suicide by patients
and assistance in suicide by their physicians, while continuing practices which
are quite the contrary. The assertion of patient's rights to commit suicide
when incurably-ill must challenge the medical profession to evaluate the basic
nature of the physician-patient relationship, the goals of medical practice, the
stewardship of medical resources and the role of the physician and patient in
relieving suffering.3°4 The fact that the medical profession in this country
298. Id. at 613.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. A 1988 initiative in California would have permitted the use of advance
directives by incompetent patients to request assistance in suicide. The California
initiative and the recent initiative in Washington state limited the right to request
assistance in suicide to terminally ill patients with six months to live.
302. Derek Humphry, Tactical ErrorsDefeated Proposed Suicide Law, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 13, 1991, at 99.
303. Public opinion seems to be moving toward accepting suicide in certain cases.
Culhane, supra note 293, at 8(1). 'An aid-in-dying plan is under consideration for
introduction in Florida. DEBENPORT, supra note 286. The General Synod of the
United Church of Christ passed a resolution affirming individual freedom and
responsibility to make a choice on euthanasia and suicide. The Methodist Church
governing body will take up the appropriateness of suicide in limited circumstances in
May, 1992. Peter Steinfels, At Crossroads, U.S. Ponders Ethics of Helping Others
Die, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1991, at Al, A15.
304. See Angell, supra note 271; Beeson, supra note 290; Cassel & Meier, supra
note 287; David Schiedermayer, et al., Euthanasia, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 120 (1989).
The latter authors raise the possibility that, if assisted suicide is appropriate and
necessary, it may be better to designate a profession other than medicine to act to
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controls access to humane methods of suicide means that physicians must be
involved in the discussion of the issue and shaping of public understanding
and response. Permitting the incurably-ill to choose death need not be a
repudiation of either medical or social values. Participation by the medical
profession in the assistance of suicide need not be required.3° Physicians,
however, at the very least, will have to become involved in frank discussions
of medical care, expectations of cure and palliation, and of management of
pain and suffering whether the right of patients to commit suicide when
terminally ill becomes formally recognized or remains tacitly acknowledged
as it is at present.
VII. CONCLUSION
Choices about life, including decisions about death "touch the core of
liberty." 0 When an individual has an incurable condition and his quality
of life has deteriorated, there must be the choice for him to affirmatively act
to end his life according to personal morals, religious beliefs and conditions.
The act of suicide is generally not illegal. Society, however, views it as
impermissible. This is, therefore, not an issue for resolution by the courts.
It is an issue for resolution by society. The obligation is on the religious
community, and the ethicists, the fabric of society, the institutions which can
convince or influence an individual's moral choice to see that true supportive
care is provided to him.
The issue of suicide is one that has plagued the human race for centuries.
It is time for the debate to continue: "[T]he merciful extinction of life, is
morally permissible and indeed mandatory where it is performed upon a dying
patient with his consent and is the only way of relieving his suffering. ' 3
assist a patient in committing suicide.
305. See supra note 304.
306. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2885 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
307. WILuAMS, supra note 14, at 311.
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